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Humphries v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 129 Nev. Adv. Op. 85 (Nov. 7, 2013)1
CIVIL PROCEDURAL: “NECESSARY PARTIES” UNDER NRCP 19
Summary
The Court determined two issues: (1) whether relief through a writ of mandamus was
appropriate for the petitioners, Humphries and Rocha, and (2) whether Ferrell, a non-party
cotortfeasor, was a necessary party under NRCP 19(a).
Disposition
Cotortfeasors are not “necessary parties” under NRCP 19(a). Thus, a plaintiff need not
join potential non-party cotortfeasors where he can receive complete relief against the defendants
he chooses to sue.
Factual and Procedural History
In 2010, an altercation took place between Erik Ferrell and the petitioners Carey
Humphries and Lorenza Rocha. The event occurred on real-party-in-interest New York-New
York’s casino floor. Humphries and Rocha filed a complaint against New York-New York
alleging assorted negligence claims based on its duty to protect, but did not include any claims
against Ferrell. As an affirmative defense, New York-New York asserted that Humphries and
Rocha were comparatively negligent.
Following the complaint, the Court issued an opinion in Café Moda, L.L.C. v. Palma,
which held that in comparative negligence cases involving multiple tortfeasors, an intentional
tortfeasor’s liability is joint and several, whereas a negligent cotortfeasor’s liability is several.2 In
light of this holding, New York-New York moved to compel the petitioners to join Ferrell,
asserting that Ferrell was a necessary party under NRCP 19(a). The district court granted the
motion and compelled the petitioners to join Ferrell. Humphries and Rocha petitioned this Court
for a writ of mandamus, seeking to vacate the order compelling joinder.
Discussion
Writ of mandamus
The Nevada Constitution gives the Court jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus.3
However, if there is a “plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law,” the
Court will not issue a writ.4 Ultimately it is within the Court’s discretion to determine whether to
consider such petitions.5
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The Court concluded that Humphries and Rocha did not have a “plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law” because the case was in the early stages of
litigation, and the district court’s order threatened to dismiss their action if they did not join
Ferrell and assert causes of action against him. The Court also saw the petition as an opportunity
to clarify its holding in Café Moda, and thus considered the petition.
The district court erred in compelling Humphries and Rocha to join Ferrell as a necessary party
To determine whether the district court erred in compelling Humphries and Rocha to join
Ferrell, the Court first determined that under the traditional doctrine of joint and several liability.
cotortfeasors are not necessary parties. NRCP 19(a) states that a person must be joined in an
action if that person is necessary to the action. A person is necessary to the action if (1) the court
cannot accord complete relief among existing parties without him, or (2) he has an interest in the
action that will be impaired by his absence.6 Accordingly, federal courts have recognized that
cotortfeasors are not necessary parties under FRCP 19(a) (the federal counterpart to the NRCP)
when the defendant is jointly and severally liable, or severally liable,7 because complete relief
can be afforded to a plaintiff, even without the presence of other potential cotortfeasors.
The Legislature, however, supplanted the common-law rules of joint and several liability
by enacting NRS 41.141, which allows a plaintiff to recover damages as long as his comparative
negligence does not exceed that of the defendant (or the combined negligence of multiple
defendants where the plaintiff has sued multiple defendants).8 The statute alters joint and several
liability by allowing for the apportionment of fault, and providing for several liability amongst
negligent defendants. NRS 41.141 has been construed as abolishing joint and several liability
between an intentional tortfeasor and a negligent tortfeasor where the two causes of action arise
from the same injury.9 Furthermore, the statute only permits limiting a defendant’s liability
where recovery is allowed against more than one defendant.10 Thus, “a negligent defendant
should be held severally liable only for the percentage of fault apportioned to it where a plaintiff
has sued multiple tortfeasors and recovery is allowed against more than one defendant.
As Ferrell is not a party to this case, NRS 41.141 does not permit the jury to apportion
fault between Ferrell and New York-New York, and it does not permit the district court to apply
several liability to New York-New York. As a result, “the statute does not change the result
reached under the traditional joint and several liability analysis: the defendant is still jointly and
severally liable for the entire judgment against it.”11
In light of this understanding of NRS 41.141, the Court declined to alter the traditional
analysis of whether cotortfeasors are necessary parties under NRCP 19(a) when the defendant is
jointly and severally liable. The existence of other non-party cotortfeasors is irrelevant to the
question of whether a plaintiff may be afforded complete relief against the persons who are
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already parties. “Accordingly, a cotortfeasor is not a party necessary to a plaintiff’s action
against another cotortfeasor.”
The Court also recognized that policy considerations militated against a per se rule
compelling a plaintiff to join cotortfeasors as necessary parties. Specifically, if a plaintiff were
unable to join a tortfeasor because the tortfeasor is unknown, immune from liability, or outside
the court’s jurisdiction, dismissal for failing to join the tortfeasor would prevent the plaintiff
from recovering any damages.
Finally, the Court emphasized that New-York-New York has the ability to implead
Ferrell on a contribution theory under NRCP 14(a), even if the petitioners chose not to bring any
cause of action against Ferrell in their original claim.12 This affords New York-New York some
relief without requiring joinder of a tortfeasor as a necessary party under NRCP 19(a).
Conclusion
Ferrell, as a non-party cotortfeasor, is not a necessary party under NRCP 19(a), and the
district court erred in compelling the petitioners to join Ferrell. Therefore, the Court granted the
petition and instructed the district court to vacate its order compelling Ferrell’s joinder and to
enter an order denying New York-New York’s motion.
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